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We study the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing 
strategies using a unique policy experiment from Norway, which in 2003 introduced a 
reference price (RP) system called “index pricing” for a sub-sample of off-patent 
pharmaceuticals, replacing the existing price cap (PC) regulation. We estimate the effect of 
the reform using a product level panel dataset, covering the drugs exposed to RP and a large 
number of drugs still under PC regulation in the time before and after the policy change. Our 
results show that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices within the 
reference group, with the effect being stronger for brand-names. We also identify a negative 
cross-price effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the RP-system. In terms of policy 
implications, the results suggest that RP is more effective than PC regulation in lowering drug 
prices, while the cross-price effect raises a concern about patent protection. 
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applies. 1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical markets are characterised by price inelastic demand, mainly due to extensive
medical insurance, and supply-side market power associated with the patent system protecting
new chemical entities from being copied within a given period.1 This combination has lead most
countries to exert various means to control the growth in medical expenditures.2 Two of the most
commonly used price control mechanisms in pharmaceutical markets are price cap regulation
and reference pricing. While the two systems share the same purpose, namely to contain (the
growth in) medical expenditures, they diﬀer substantially in nature. Price cap regulation limits
the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ ability to exploit market power by charging high prices, while reference
pricing aims at stimulating competition by making demand for pharmaceuticals more price
elastic. The link between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ pricing strategies has
received surprisingly little attention in the literature, and the main purpose of this paper is to
ﬁll this gap.3
We exploit a unique policy experiment from Norway to assess the relative performance of
reference pricing and price cap regulation. In 2003 the Norwegian government introduced a
reference price system called "index pricing" to a set of oﬀ-patent pharmaceuticals, replacing
the existing price cap regime, which was based on international price comparisons. Since only
a sub-sample of the oﬀ-patent drugs was exposed to reference pricing, the policy reform can be
classiﬁed as a quasi-natural experiment. We exploit a rich product level panel dataset covering
a four-year period from 2001 to 2005. Besides having data on all drugs exposed to the reference
price system, we also have data on a substantial number of drugs still subject to the existing
price cap regulation. This latter group of drugs consists of drugs that are either therapeutic
substitutes or unrelated in consumption to the drugs exposed to reference pricing. In addition
1A seminal contribution on the impact of insurance on the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs
is Leibowitz et al (1985), who exploit the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. A more recent contribution on
this issue is Contoyannis et al. (2005). There are also studies that estimate the impact of marketing (e.g., Rizzo,
1999) on the price elasticities for prescription drugs.
2The US is the exception among Western countries. However, the recent inclusion of prescription drugs
in Medicare has spurred a debate of price controls also in the US (e.g., Huskamp et al, 2000, Kanavos and
Reinhardt, 2003). In addition, (generic) reference pricing is well-established through the "maximum allowable
charge" programs used by, e.g., Medicaid.
3Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview over issues and related literature on price regulation in phar-
maceutical markets. For reference price systems, see the literature surveys by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy
(2000), Danzon (2001) and Puig-Junoy (2005).
2to exploiting the before-after reform variation in prices, we make use of the non-included drugs
as a comparison group to identify the price eﬀects on the drugs subject to the policy experiment,
as well as any cross-price eﬀects on therapeutic substitutes not exposed to the experiment.
Under price cap regulation, the regulator sets a maximum price that can be charged for
each product. The price cap is set when a new patent-protected drug enters the market. To be
eﬀective (binding), the price cap needs to be lower than the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximising (monopoly)
price. Competition can, however, induce the ﬁrms to reduce the price on the original brand-name
drug below the price cap level. First, if a new drug with similar therapeutic properties enters
the market, the original drug can be forced to set a lower price to avoid loosing too much of its
market share. Second, when the original drug looses its patent protection, generic substitutes
can enter the market with lower prices to captu r em a r k e ts h a r e sf r o mt he original drug. Our
dataset allows us to identify the price eﬀects due to therapeutic competition (ﬁrst type) and
generic competition (second type).4
Under reference pricing, the regulator enforces no explicit restrictions on the pharmaceutical
ﬁrms’ price setting. The ﬁrms are allowed to charge any price they like. Instead the regulator
sets a maximum reimbursement price (the reference price) to be paid for a group of drugs
("clusters").5 Purchase of drugs with price above the reference price results in a surcharge
equal to the diﬀerence between the drug’s price and the reference price.6 This surcharge may
be imposed by the regulator on the consumer, the prescribing physician, or, as in Norway,
the dispensing pharmacy. The intention of reference pricing is to rectify the distortion in price
sensitivity imposed by insurance, potentially resulting in lower prices and medical expenditures.7
We ﬁnd that the reference price system introduced in Norway has a strong price reducing
eﬀect on the drugs exposed to this regime, with the eﬀect being stronger for brand-names (18
to 19 percent) than generics (7 to 8 percent). This conﬁrms that reference pricing triggers price
4We do not analyse the impact of (generic) entry on drug prices. This has been the subject of several papers,
e.g., Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Frank and Salkever (1997).
5The deﬁnition of clusters is a controversial issue. It is common to distinguish between generic and therapeutic
reference pricing, where the former involves clustering of drugs that are chemically identical (generics), while the
latter involves clustering of drugs that have similar therapeutic eﬀects (therapeutic substitutes). We return to
this issue in the next section.
6Often the reference price is set equal to the lowest priced drug in the cluster. However, if this is not the
case, the diﬀerence between the reference price and a lower priced drug is often shared between the payer and the
dispensing pharmacy to create incentives to also sell those drugs (Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000).
7The clustering of drugs, as deﬁned by reference price regulation, might also provide information about sub-
stitutable drugs that can treat a particular disease, which in itself can increase the price sensitivity of demand.
3competition within the cluster of drugs exposed to the regime. Since the reference price system
in Norway included oﬀ-patent products only, the identiﬁed price eﬀect is solely due to generic
c o m p e t i t i o nt r i g g e r e db yt h er e f o r m .
Interestingly, we also identify a negative cross-price eﬀect of the policy reform on the non-
included therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation, providing evidence on thera-
peutic competition in the market. The eﬀect is weaker (2.2 percent), as we would expect, since
these drugs have diﬀerent chemical substances and therefore are only imperfect substitutes to
the drugs exposed to reference pricing. When we decompose the eﬀect, we ﬁnd that it is merely
the generics that respond to the reform (by 6.4 percent). An obvious explanation is that the
price cap is binding for the brand-names but not for the generics. This implies that we capture
any price reductions on the generics, while for brand-names we observe only price reductions
below the price cap. However, under free pricing, or less strict price regulation, it is likely that
also the brand-names will reduce their prices as a response to the lower prices triggered by
reference pricing.
The Norwegian policy experiment provides an excellent opportunity to assess the relative
performance of two diﬀerent regulatory regimes; reference pricing and price cap regulation. Our
results suggest that reference pricing is more eﬀective than price cap regulation in reducing drug
prices. To indicate the economic signiﬁcance of the reform, we can calculate potential savings in
medical expenditures, using 2002, the year before the reform was introduced, as our benchmark.
In 2002, the total sales value of the drugs included in the reference price system amounted to
474.4 mill NOK, with a brand-name market share of about 72 percent. Using our estimated
price reductions of about 18 percent on brand-names and 8 percent of generics, we obtain cost
saving of about 75 mill NOK. This is a conservative ﬁgure for two reasons. First, the reference
price system is likely to trigger a shift in market shares from the brand-names to the generics
(e.g., Aronsson et al., 2001). Second, when extending the reform to the whole generic market
segment, the savings (in absolute terms) will be even higher.
A potential downside of the reference price system is related to the negative cross-price eﬀect
on non-included therapeutic substitutes. This raises a concern that reference pricing may reduce
patent protection, which in turn can aﬀect national launching decisions and global innovation
incentives, especially if reference pricing becomes wide-spread and/or is implemented in large,
4high-income countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we relate our paper to existing
literature. In section 3, we present institutional facts about the Norwegian pharmaceutical
market, the regulatory regime and the policy reform introducing reference pricing. In section
4, we present a theoretical model to motivate our empirical study. In section 5, we present our
dataset and some descriptive statistics. In section 6, we carry out the econometric analysis and
report our empirical results. Finally, in section 7, concluding remarks are presented.
2 Related Literature
The literature on the performance of diﬀerent regulatory regimes on pharmaceutical price setting
is limited, and many of the empirical studies are descriptive.8 Our paper is a contribution in
that respect. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Below we relate our paper to these.
In a theoretical paper, Danzon and Lui (1996) argues that all prices within the cluster will
converge towards the reference price, implying a price decrease on the high-price (brand-name)
drugs and a price increase on the low-price (generic) drugs, leaving the net price and cost saving
eﬀect of reference pricing unclear.9 Moreover, Zweifel and Grivelli (1997), who provide a theory
model and some anecdotal evidence from Germany, suggest that reference pricing produces
an immediate reduction in brand-name prices to the reference price level but has no eﬀect on
generics.
However, more recent studies, including ours, ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of reference pricing not
only on brand-names but indeed also on generics. Aronsson et al. (2001) analyse how brand-
name market shares are aﬀected by generic competition, in general, and (generic) reference
pricing, in particular. Using data from Sweden for the time period 1972-96, they ﬁnd that the
price of brand-name relative to t h ea v e r a g ep r i c eo fg e n e r i c sa ﬀects the brand-name market
share for 5 out of 12 diﬀerent substances. Extending the model to capture the eﬀect of the
8See the literature surveys by Danzon (1997), Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000), Danzon (2001), and
Puig-Junoy (2005).
9This result relies on the assumptions that the reference price is set above the lowest price in the reference
cluster and that demand is perfectly inelastic below the reference price. However, many countries set the reference
price equal to the lowest price, and, those that don’t, often share the beneﬁt from selling a drug with a price
below the reference price with the dispensing pharmacy. Moreover, if there is coinsurance, demand is likely to be
elastic also under the reference price. We return to this issue in Section 4.
5reference price system introduced in 1993, they provide evidence that reference pricing has a
negative eﬀect on brand-name market share, but only for 3 substances. However, as the authors
point out themselves, they have an identiﬁcation problem because the reference price system is
likely to aﬀect the relative prices on brand-names and generics directly. They therefore perform
a test on the price eﬀects of reference prices, which indicates a strong negative eﬀect on both
brand-names and generics.
A more recent study by Bergman and Rudholm (2003), also based on Swedish data, analyses
the impact of actual and potential competition between brand-names and generics, where ‘po-
tential competition’ is deﬁned as a situation where the brand-name’s patent has expired but no
generics have entered. Using data on 18 substances for the same period as the previous study
(1972-96), they ﬁnd that the price of the brand-name is lowered by both actual and potential
generic competition. They also ﬁnd that the reference price system introduced in 1993 has a
strong negative eﬀect on brand-name prices (16-21 percent), but only for the drugs facing actual
competition.
Pavcnik (2002), which is the closest study to ours, analyses the impact of the introduction
of (therapeutic) reference pricing in Germany in 1989 on pharmaceutical prices, focusing on the
change in patient out-of-pocket expenses. Using data on two diﬀerent therapeutic ﬁelds (oral
antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for the time period 1986-96, she identiﬁes strong price decreases
for both brand-names and generics, with the price reductions being more pronounced for the
brand-names. She also ﬁnds that brand-names with more generic competitors reduce prices
more.
Finally, there exists a recent paper by Dalen et al. (2006) analysing the same policy reform
in Norway (the index price system) as we do. They use a structural approach, with prices as
instruments, to estimate the impact of the reform on demand and market power, and concludes
that the index price system increases the market shares of generic drugs and reduces overall
market power. However, their dataset only covers the six chemical substances subject to the
reference price system, as well as a limited number of pharmacies (22 of about 500).
The policy experiment in Norway enables us to advance the literature along several dimen-
sions. First, it allows us to establish a proper comparison group to carefully estimate the net
price eﬀect of the reference price system. The previously mentioned studies resort to comparison
6of prices and/or market shares before and after the introduction of reference pricing. In Sweden
there was no policy experiment since all oﬀ-patent drugs were exposed to reference pricing in
1993. Dalen et al. (2006) could have made use of the policy experiment in Norway, but did not
by focusing only on the drugs exposed to reference pricing. The exception is Pavcnik (2002)
who exploits the gradually extension of the reference price system within the oral antidiabetic
group in Germany to establish a comparison group. A potential problem with her comparison
group is that it consists of therapeutic substitutes to the ones exposed to reference pricing, and,
as our results show, there may be cross-price eﬀects that can potentially bias the results.
Second, the policy experiment allows us to analyse generic and therapeutic competition.
Generic competition has received substantial attention in the literature, possibly because of
the so-called "generic paradox", where empirical studies have shown that brand-name drugs
respond to generic entry by rising their prices (see e.g., Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank
and Salkever, 1997).10 The evidence from the Swedish market provided by Aaronsson et al.
(2001) and Bergman and Rudholm (2003) and the German based study by Pavcnik (2002) do
not support the "generic paradox" result. All studies ﬁnd that generic entry or competition
results in lower brand-name prices, which is also conﬁrmed by our study. However, it is very
likely that the diﬀerence in results may be due to diﬀerent market structures and regulatory
regimes in the US compared with European countries.
The literature on therapeutic competition is much more limited. An important exception
is Ellison et al. (1997) that use US data from one therapeutic ﬁeld (cephalosporin), provid-
ing evidence of high elasticities between generic substitutes and also signiﬁcant, though lower,
elasticities between therapeutic substitutes. Consistent with Ellison et al. (1997), we provide
evidence of therapeutic competition in the pharmaceutical market, although this competition
is, as one would expect, weaker than competition from generic substitutes.
Finally, our study also contributes to the debate on generic versus therapeutic reference
pricing (see e.g., Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). Generic reference pricing (like in
Norway and Sweden) is considered to be uncontroversial in contrast to therapeutic reference
pricing (like in Germany) for two reasons: ﬁrst, since generic reference pricing only includes
10The "generic paradox" have been challenged by, for instance, Caves et al. (1991) who ﬁnd that generic entry
is associated with brand-name prices reductions. However, the reductions are economically small, much smaller
than one would expect from products that are supposed to be perfect substitutes.
7drugs with the same active chemical substances, it should not expose patients to any health
risks. Second, since generic reference pricing applies by deﬁnition to oﬀ-patent drugs only, it is
perceived to not aﬀect patent protection, and thus launching and innovation incentives.
A recent theoretical paper by Brekke et al. (2007) challenges the "innocence" of generic
reference pricing. They show that the price reductions on the drugs exposed to generic reference
pricing triggers price reductions also on non-included (potentially on-patent) therapeutic sub-
stitutes. They also show that generic reference pricing result in larger co-payment diﬀerences
between the referenced drugs and their therapeutic substitutes, resulting in more therapeutic
substitution and thus higher patient health risks than therapeutic reference pricing.
Our data does not enable us to test the eﬀect of reference pricing on the patients’ health risk
or the market entry and innovation incentives of the ﬁrms.11 However, we provide evidence on
an e g a t i v ec r o s s - p r i c ee ﬀect of the generic reference price system on therapeutic substitutes not
subject to this system. This conﬁrms the concern raised by Brekke et al. (2007) that not only
therapeutic reference pricing but also generic reference pricing may reduce patent protection
and potentially expose patients to health risks.
3 The Norwegian Pharmaceutical Market
The Norwegian pharmaceutical market is extensively regulated, as in most other countries. The
regulatory body is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services and its agency called
the Norwegian Medicines Agency. Norway has adopted the European patent law system to a
large extent, implying that all new chemical entities are subject to patent protection for a given
period. However, the pharmaceutical ﬁrms still need government approval to launch a new
product in Norway. In addition, they must submit an application providing suﬃcient evidence
of beneﬁts compared with costs from the drug therapy in order to get the drug listed in the
reimbursement system (the blue list). Once this is obtained, the prices are subject to price
control.
The current system is a price cap scheme based on international reference pricing, also
11A paper by Danzon and Ketchham (2004) analyses the eﬀect of reference pricing on the availability of drugs
in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand, providing results that indicate that the strictness of the reference
price systems tends to lower the number of drugs available in a country.
8called external referencing. This system was introduced in 2001, and covers all prescription
drugs, both on-patent and oﬀ-patent, except for those included in the reference price system.
The government requires that a producer (say Pﬁzer) that sells a prescription drug (say Lipitor)
on the Norwegian market, reports the foreign prices of this drug in a deﬁned set of "comparable"
countries.12 The price cap, which is the maximum domestic price a producer can charge for its
product, is then set equal to the average of the three lowest reported foreign prices of this drug.
Generic versions receive the same price cap as the brand-names, implying that the price cap
rarely binds for this group of drugs. The price cap is imposed at the wholesale level, leaving the
producer prices unregulated. The government then deﬁnes a maximum mark-up the pharmacies
can charge, which in turn determines the price cap on the retail price for each product.
The reference price system, called index pricing, was int r o d u c e di nM a r c h2 0 0 3f o ras u b s a m -
ple of oﬀ-patent pharmaceuticals facing generic competition. Initially, the index price system
covered six chemical substances: Citalopram (depression), Omeprazol (antiulcer), Cetirizin (al-
lergy), Loratadin (allergy), Enalapril (high blood pressure) and Lisinopril (high blood pressure).
In June 2004 Simvastatin (high cholesterol) was included. The choice of drugs were based on two
criteria: ﬁrst, they should cover a wide set of diseases, and not be concentrated in one particular
disease type; second, the selected drugs should be high-volum drugs in terms of sales.13 The
government decided to terminate the system by the end of 2004, arguing that the price reduc-
tions and cost savings were lower than expected.14 Thus, in total the system run for almost two
years.
The government calculated the index price as follows. First, the drugs were classiﬁed into
clusters based on chemical substance. Then within each cluster, the drugs were classiﬁed into
subgroups depending on the package size and dosage in order to adjust for cost variation. Second,
the index price was calculated as the sales weighted sum of producer prices of the drugs included
12The Norwegian basket of "comparable" countries consis t so fA u s t r i a ,B e l g i u m ,D a n m a r k ,F i n l a n d ,G e r m a n y ,
Irland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Southern and Eastern Europian countries, as well as France and
Switzerland, are excluded. If the product is not yet launched in any of the countries in the basket, the price cap
will be determined by negotiations between the producer and the regulator.
13The ﬁrst criteria is helpful for identiﬁcation purposes since it provides us with proper control groups. The
second criteria could potentially be a problem if the selected drugs diﬀer from the non-selected drugs in price
patterns. We therefore explicitly test whether this is the case, and report our results in Section 6.2, Table 3.
14The decision was based on an evaluation report, using data until February 2004. As will be shown below,
our analysis strongly indicates that the evaluation was carried out too early. Price reductions became substantial
after some time, especially during 2004.
9in each subgroup. For the six chemical substances initially included, there were 16 index prices
in total. The government repeated this exercise every three months, resulting in a revised index
price for every quarter of a year. Formally, the index price for a given period t, denoted by It,

















i is the producer price of product i in the previous period (t − 1), qt−1
i is the quantity
sold of product i in the previous period, measured in tablets or deﬁned daily doses (DDD),
and, thus, Mt−1
i is the market share of product i in the previous period. Since each period
t lasts for three months, all variables are average values. The index price was the maximum
reimbursement for every drug in the reference group. We see that the index price is reduced
if lower-priced (generic) drugs increase their market share, and/or if there is a price decrease
of the higher-priced (brand-name) drugs and/or the lower-priced (generic) drugs generic in the
cluster.
A special feature of the Norwegian reference price system relative to other reference price
systems is that the pharmacies were exposed to all incentives. Not only did they keep the
margin of selling a (generic) drug with a price lower than the index price, but they also had
to bear the full cost of selling a (brand-name) drug with a price higher than the index price.
Importantly, generic substitution was allowed in 2001, so the pharmacies could suggest a cheaper
(generic) drug, although the physicians had written a brand-name drug on the prescription
(which they frequently tend to do). If the patients refused to accept a generic substitution, they
had to pay the surcharge associated with the diﬀerence between the high-priced (brand-name)
drug and the index price, as is common in most other reference price systems. On the other
hand, the physicians could blockade generic substitution by actively writing an argument on the
prescription of why this particular patient is better oﬀ with the brand-name drug. In such cases,
the price cap system was reintroduced.
In Norway there is a statutory public health insurance, covering the whole population. Close
to 70 percent of the total drug expenses are covered by this insurance scheme. For prescription
drugs on the reimbursement list (the blue list), patients pay a ﬁxed share (36 percent) of the drug
10price, constrained by a maximum amount per prescription (400 NOK) and per calendar year
(1.350 NOK). Notably, the index price system did not change the structure of the patient out-of-
pocket payments, except for the case when the patients refused to accept a cheaper generic drug,
as described above. However, the amount of the patient out-of-pocket payments may, of course,
be aﬀected to the extent that the reference pricing aﬀects prices and choices of pharmaceuticals.
4 A Theoretical Model
To motivate our empirical analysis, we present a theoretical model focusing on the impact of
regulatory regimes on pharmaceutical price setting. Consider a particular therapeutical market
with an original brand-name drug (drug B) facing competition from a generic version (drug
G). Consumers are (partially) insured and face a co-payment ci when demanding drug i,w h e r e
i = B,G. Demand for drug i,g i v e nb yDi (cB,c G), is decreasing in the co-payment for drug i,
but increasing in the co-payment for drug j, i.e., ∂Di/∂ci < 0,∂ D i/∂cj > 0.W e l e t ﬁrm i’s
(gross) proﬁtb eg i v e nb yπi = piDi (cB,c G),w h e r epi is the price charged for drug i. In line with
empirical observations, we assume the demand structure is such that the brand-name ﬁrm is able
to charge a higher price than the generic ﬁrm without loosing all demand. Implicitly, this means
that the two products cannot be perceived as perfect substitutes despite being therapeutically
equivalent.15
Price Cap Regulation (PC). Under price cap regulation the regulator imposes a maxi-
mum price, b p,t h eﬁrms can charge for their products. Consistent with empirical observations,
we let the price cap be binding for the brand-name drug only, i.e., pB = b p.W ea s s u m et h a tci
takes the form of coinsurance, i.e., ci = αpi,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1) is the coinsurance rate deﬁning the
cost-sharing between the patient and the payer. We then get the following ﬁrst-order condition
deﬁning the optimal generic price:
∂πG
∂pG




15The existing theoretical contributions on branded vs generic competition — e.g., Frank and Salkever (1992),
Brekke et al (2007), Königbauer (2007) — apply explicit asymmetric demand systems that result in higher brand-
name than generic prices. They also provide detailed justiﬁcations (e.g., brand-name marketing, consumer expe-
rience/information, prescribing habits, etc.) for the asymmetry in brand-name and generic demand.
11The impact of a change in the price cap on the generic price can be derived by total diﬀer-








Assuming that the second-order condition is satisﬁed (negative denominator) and that prices are
strategic complements (positive numerator), there is a positive relationship between the price
cap and the generic price. Thus, a stricter price cap directly reduces the brand-name price, and
indirectly induces the generic ﬁrm to lower its price in order to maintain market shares, and vice
versa. We therefore expect to observe a positive relationship between the price cap and prices
for both brand-names and generics.16
Reference Pricing (RP). Under reference pricing, the pharmaceutical ﬁrms are free to
set their prices at any level. The regulator imposes instead a reference price e p,w h i c hi st h e
maximum reimbursement for a group of drugs with similar therapeutic properties (here: drug
B and G). The reference price is set somewhere between the brand-name and the generic price,
i.e., pG < e p<p B. A central feature of reference pricing is that a patient demanding (or a
pharmacy dispensing) a high-priced brand-name drug, will have to cover the price diﬀerence,
i.e., cB = αe p+(pB − e p).T h eﬁrst-order conditions for the brand-name and the generic ﬁrm are:
∂πB
∂pB










respectively. We see from (2) that the coinsurance rate α is not a part of the second term,
implying a higher demand responsiveness to price changes for the brand-name drug. Since
reference pricing imposes a higher brand-name co-payment, brand-name demand is also lower
for given prices. Thus, reference pricing introduces an incentive for the brand-ﬁrm to lower its
price in order to maintain market shares.
The incentives for the generic ﬁrm are, however, less clear. Reference pricing implies, all
16However, if the price cap is set very strict, generic drugs might exit (or not enter) the market, which could po-
tentially result in higher average prices. Danzon and Ketchham (2004) provide evidence that generic competition
is weaker in countries with strict price regulation.
12else equal, a higher brand-name co-payment, which shifts consumers toward the generic ﬁrm.
Facing a higher demand, it is optimal for the generic ﬁrm to increase its price. However, since
the brand-name ﬁrm responds to reference pricing by lowering its price, the net eﬀect on brand-
name co-payment is ambigious. Our model predicts, thus, that if reference pricing leads to a
lower (higher) equilibrium brand-name co-payment, this will trigger a reduction (increase) in
the price of the generic drug.17
The ranking of price cap and reference price regulation in terms of price leves is in general
ambiguous. More precisely, the ranking will depend on the strictness of the price cap b p relative
to reference price level e p. Clearly, if the price cap is very strict (e.g., close to marginal production
costs), there is limited scope for reference pricing to reduce prices further. A switch from price
cap regulation to reference pricing implies by deﬁnition that the reference price is set below the
price cap, i.e., e p<b p = pPC
B (in practice, often close to the generic price, e p → pPC
G ). Thus,
our prediction is that reference pricing leads to lower drug prices if the reference price is set
suﬃciently low relative to the initial price cap level.
To summarise, the following predictions can be derived from the model:
1. There is a positive relationship between the price cap and brand-name and generic prices.
2. Reference pricing provides an incentive for the brand-name to reduce prices, while the
incentive to reduce generic prices is weaker, potentially ambiguous.
3. Reference pricing leads to lower prices than price cap regulation only if the reference price
is suﬃciently low relative to the price cap level.
5 Data and Descriptive Results
5.1 Data
In the empirical analysis we use data from Farmastat.18 Their database includes information on
sales value and volume for each package of drugs sold at the Norwegian pharmaceutical market.











B − (1 − α) e p<α b p.
18Farmastat is a company specialised in provision of pharmaceutical statistics. The company is owned by the
Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.
13substance according to the ATC-code system.19 The database also provides information about
product name, manufacturer, launch date, price cap, whether the product is a brand-name or a













A02BA02 No  Yes  ZANTAC  GLAXOSMITHKLIN 5  254 
A02BC01  Yes  No  LOSEC       ASTRAZENECA  1  86 
A02BC03 No  Yes  LANZO  WYETH-LEDERLE  0  48 
A02BC05 No  Yes  NEXIUM  ASTRAZENECA  0  48 
C07AB02 No  No  SELO-ZOK  ASTRAZENECA  3  109 
C07AB03 No  No  TENORMIN  PFIZER  5  242 
C09AA02 Yes  No  RENITEC    MSD  3  131 





C09BA02 No  Yes  RENITEC 
COMP 
MSD 1  72 
C09CA01 No  Yes  COZAAR  MSD  0  48 
C09DA01 No  Yes  COZAAR 
COMP  
MSD 0  48 
C10AA01 Yes    (1.6.2004)  No  ZOCOR  MSD  2  82 
C10AA03 No  Yes  PRAVACHOL  B-MYERS  SQUIBB  0  48 
C10AA05 No  Yes  LIPITOR PFIZER  0  48 
G04BE03 No  No  VIAGRA  PFIZER  0  48 
L02BB03 No  No  CASODEX  ASTRAZENECA  0  48 
M01AH01 No  No  CELEBRA  PFIZER  0  48 
M01AH02 No  No  VIOXX  MSD  0  45 
M05BA04 No  No  FOSAMAX  MSD  0  48 
N02BE01 No  No  PANODIL  GLAXOSMITHKLIN  4  240 
N02CC01 No  No  IMIGRAN  GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0  48 
N05AH03 No  No  ZYPREXA  ELI  LILLY  0  48 
N06AB04 Yes  No  CIPRAMIL  LUNDBECK  3  112 
N06AB05 No  Yes  SEROXAT  GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0  48 
N06AB06 No  Yes  ZOLOFT PFIZER  0  48 
N06AX03 No  Yes  TOLVON  ORGANON  1  96 
R03AK06 No  No  SERETIDE  GLAXOSMITHKLIN 0  48 
R03AK07 No  No  SYMBICORT  ASTRAZENECA  0  44 





R06AX13 Yes  No  CLARITYN    SCHERING-PLOUGH  4  176 
Total         37  2765 
 
From this database we have data on all prescription drugs within the 30 largest ATC-groups (in
terms of sales value) over a four year period from 2001 through 2004. Table 1 lists ATC-code,
brand-name, and manufacturer of these pharmaceuticals. The table also gives information about
19The ATC-code system is used by the World Health Organization to classify pharmaceutical substances accord-
ing to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Pharmaceuticals sharing the same seven-ﬁgure
ATC-code have the same active ingredients and are considered equivalent in the treatment of a given disease.
14whether the drugs within each ATC-code are subject to reference pricing, whether the branded
drug faces generic competition, and whether a drug is classiﬁed as a therapeutic competitor to a
drug in the reference price group. This last classiﬁcation is based on therapeutic categories. For
example, Losec with ATC-code A02BC01 is included in the index price system, and therefore
all pharmaceuticals with A02 as the ﬁrst three characters in the ATC-code are classiﬁed as
therapeutic competitors to Losec.20
In our analysis, we deﬁne a product as all presentations of a given drug produced by a
given manufacturer. For example, the brand-name Zantac together with ﬁve generic products
give a total of six products in ATC-group A02BA02. For each product, prices are calculated
as total sales values divided by the total volume sold (in DDD). All prices therefore refer to
average prices per deﬁned daily dose of the active ingredient; a price measure that enables
comparison across diﬀerent formulations (tablets, capsules, etc.) within each product, and also
across diﬀerent active ingredients. The prices have been deﬂated using the consumer-price index.
Time is measured in one-month periods, and thea v e r a g ep r i c eo fe a c hp r o d u c ti ne a c ht i m e -
period constitutes an observation. The number of observations is not identical in each period,
which is due to generic entry during our sample period. In such cases, the product does not
appear in our data, leaving us with an unbalanced panel. The number of observations within
each ATC-group is given in the last column in Table 1. The total number of observations in our
analysis is 2765.
5.2 Descriptive results
A natural starting point for the descriptive analysis is to look at how average prices have de-
veloped over time. In Figure 1, we plot average prices for brand-names and generics for the
following three groups of pharmaceuticals: (i) the pharmaceuticals subject to reference pric-
ing, (ii) the drugs that are therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation, and (iii) the
others, which are independent in consumption and exposed to price cap regulation.
20Our deﬁnition of therapeutic substitutes follows the standard in the literature (see e.g., Pavcnik, 2002, and
Ellison et al., 1997). With this deﬁnition, we still have a subgroup of drugs within the C07-group that can be
regarded as therapeutic substitutes for some C09-drugs for a limited set of conditions. Including the C09-group
among the therapeutic substitutes in the regressions only marginally alter the coeﬃcient estimates. The estimated
eﬀects of the reform remain unaltered.
15Figure 1: Average prices of drugs subject to reference pricing, their therapeutic competitors and
the “others” group
With time measured in one-month periods, the reference price regulation was introduced in
period 27 in the ﬁgure. Average prices of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing display
a pronounced decrease after the implementation of the reform. In Table 2, we have calculated
the average price in the periods before and after the implementation of the index price system.
Table 2. Average prices before and after reference pricing.
  Prices before   Prices after  Percentage price 
change 
 
Drug subject to 
reference pricing 
4.66 (3.18)  3.48 (2.23)  -25.32% 
Therapeutic 
competitors  
6.95 (2.78)  6.09 (2.55)  -12.37% 
Other drugs  14.21 (16.89)  14.05 (16.34)  -0.01% 
 
We ﬁnd that average prices in the pre-regulation period is about 4.7 NOK, while average prices
during reference pricing is about 3.3 NOK. This implies a price reduction of more than 29
percent. Turning to the therapeutic competitor group, we ﬁnd a somewhat similar price pattern
as in the group of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing prior to the reform, but the
16Figure 2: Average prices of brand-names and generics in the reference pricing group
decrease in average prices after the reform is much smaller, about 12 percent. The average
prices in the “others” group show a quite diﬀerent price pattern; a large decline in the ﬁrst part
of the reference price period is followed by an increase in the second part of this period.
To get a better understanding of the price patterns depicted in Figure 1, we plot the average
prices of brand-names and generics together with the average price cap for the three groups. In
Figure 2, we see that prior to the reform changes in the average price of the brand-name drugs
are related to changes in the price cap. After implementation of the reference price regulation
the average price of the brand name drugs has been steadily decreasing. Interestingly, in the
post-regulation period, average prices of generic drugs follow almost the same price pattern as
brand-name pharmaceuticals. The large variation in the average price of the generics in the
period before the reform is almost entirely due to entry of new generic drugs. In Figure A1 in
the Appendix, we have plotted the same average prices as in Figure 2, but only included generics
that have been in the market during the entire sample period. From this ﬁgure, we see that the
average price of generics follows the same trend as the average prices of brand-names.
From Figure 3 and 4 we see that average prices of brand-names in the therapeutic competitor
group and the “others” group follow the maximum price over the entire period. This indicates
17Figure 3: Average prices of brand-names and generics in the therapeutic competitor group
Figure 4: Average prices of brand-names and generics in the “others” group
18Figure 5: Average sales (in DDD) of brand-names and generics in the reference pricing group
that the reference price regulation had a small, if any eﬀect on the price setting of brand-name
drugs in the group of pharmaceuticals not directly aﬀected by the regulation. However, average
prices of generic drugs in the therapeutic competitor group follow the same pattern as prices
for generics in the reference pricing group, which indicates that much of the price reduction in
the "therapeutic competitor" group is explained by a reduction in prices on generic drugs. An
obvious reason is that the price cap is binding for the brand-names but not for the generics. As
a consequence, we will observe any price reduction on the generics, while for brand-names we
observe only price reductions below the price cap.
In Figure 5 we have plotted the (average) amount of brand-name and generic drugs, measured
in DDDs, sold in each month during the observation period.21 Over time, also before the reform,
we see a gradual increase in the sales of generic substitutes. The strong increase in the sales of
branded producs in February-April 2001 is not as strong during the same months one year later.
Instead sales of generics increase more. During the months when the reference pricing system is
in work the diﬀerence in market shares between branded and generic products is considerably
21The repeated sharp peaks followed by steep drops in sales that arise each year in December (peak) and January
(drop) can be explained by the cap on consumer out-of-pocket expenditures of NOK 1350 per year. As further
expenditures within the calendar year are fully reimbursed by the public health insurance scheme, consumers
stockpilie drugs by the end of the calendar year. Besides from that, the curves also show some seasonal variation
in drug consumption.
19reduced. This corresponds well with the results presented in Aronsson et al. (2001) and Dalen
et al. (2006).
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Design and econometric model
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 5 suggest a strong, negative price response on
pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing. There are also some indications of a negative
cross-price eﬀect of the reform on non-included therapeutic competitors. In this section, we
present an econometric framework to analyse the price eﬀects of the reform more carefully.
Ideally, in order to estimate the eﬀect of introducing reference pricing, we would like to know
what the prices on the products aﬀected by the reform would have been had the reform not been
imposed on them. Since we only observe prices for these products with the imposed reform, we
let the prices from a set of other comparable products represent the counterfactual. Having panel
data, we are able to compare inter-temporal variation in prices before and after the imposition
of the reform. Therefore, identiﬁcation relies not only on before-after comparison, but also on
comparison of price variation for drugs subject to the reform with price variation for comparable
drugs not subject to the reform.
Our econometric framework is based on an application of a model used in numerous evalu-
ation studies (e.g., Ashenfelter 1978; Card and Sullivan 1988; Lavy 2002; Pavcnik 2002), where
(permanent) unobserved diﬀerences between pharmaceuticals are controlled for by including
product ﬁxed eﬀects in the model. Following the convention from this literature, we use the
notion ‘treatment group’ for the pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing, while pharmaceu-
ticals not subject to the reform are used as a comparison group.
In this section, we closely follow Lavy (2002) and Pavcnik (2002). Let the dummy variable
Dit indicate treatment status for a given product, and let Pit (0) indicate the price of product
i in period t if the product is not exposed to treatment (Dit =0 ) .T h eﬁxed eﬀect model then
implies that the price of any untreated product i at time t can be written as
Pit (0) = X0
itβ + ai + δt + εit. (4)
20Here, ai is a product ﬁxed eﬀect, δt is a period speciﬁce ﬀect common to all products,
εit represents unobserved time varying factors that aﬀect prices, and X0
it contains observable
variables. In the model, the error term εit is allowed to be correlated with ai, but not with the
treatment status Dit.
We estimate the average price eﬀect of the reform, measured by α. The post-reform prices for
pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing becomes: Pit (1) = Pit (0)+α. Hence, the observed
price for product i in time period t c a nb ew r i t t e na s
Pit = X0
itβ + ai + δt + αDit + εit, (5)
where the error term εit is assumed to be uncorrelated with Dit as well as with X0
it and δt.
This assumption has several testable implications: ﬁrst, any price diﬀerences prior to the re-
form between products in the treatment group and products in the comparison group can be
explained by observable variables and the product speciﬁce ﬀect ai. Second, after controlling for
observables and the product speciﬁce ﬀects, the price trend for drugs in the comparison group
should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the post-reform period compared with the pre-reform
period.
Since Dit is an interaction term22 equal to 1 for products and periods subject to the reform
and 0 f o ra l lo t h e rd r u g s ,t h e nα is the estimated total eﬀect of introducing reference pricing.
However, previous studies have found that prices on brand-names and generics adjust diﬀerently
to price regulations (e.g., Aronsson et al., 2001, Pavcnik, 2002). To distinguish between brand-
names and generics, we therefore interact Dit with a dummy Bi that equals 1 if product i is a
brand-name.
We are also interested in whether there is a cross-price eﬀect of reference pricing on thera-
peutic competitors. Pharmaceuticals with diﬀerent chemical compounds but similar therapeutic
eﬀects are typically substitutes in treatment. It is therefore likely that price responses triggered
by the reference price system may inﬂuence the pricing of non-included therapeutic substitutes.23
22For products within six of the seven therapeutic substances subjected to the reference price system, this
variable equals zero for period t =1 ,...,26, and one for period t =2 7 ,...,48. For products within the seventh
substance, that was included as of June 2004, the variable equals zero up to period t =4 1and one thereafter.
23Ellison et al. (1997) provide evidence of negative price elasticities between drugs with diﬀerent chemical
compounds but therapeutically similar eﬀects.
21To estimate such eﬀects, we introduce the variables DTCit and DTCit ∗Bi,w h e r eDTCit is the
interaction between a dummy indicating observations in the post-reform periods and a dummy
indicating whether or not a product is a therapeutic competitor. After taking the natural log
of prices, our estimating equation thus becomes
lnPit = X0
itβ + ai + δt + α1Dit + α2Dit ∗ Bi (6)
+ α3DTCit + α4DTCit ∗ Bi + εit.
Note that we by this speciﬁcation have two diﬀerent treatment groups. The ﬁrst group
consists of pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing, the second group of their therapeutic
competitors, while the drugs in the "others" group serve as our comparison group. Excluding
the therapeutic competitors from the comparison group enables us to capture potential cross-
price eﬀects, and also ensures that the comparison group consists of drugs not aﬀected by the
reform. In the next section, we conduct tests that provide evidence that the "others" group is
a valid comparison group.
The direct price eﬀect of the reform is measured by α1 and α2. α1 is the estimated price
eﬀect of the reform on generics subject to reference pricing, α2 measures whether reference
pricing inﬂuences brand-names diﬀerently than generics, and thus α1 + α2 is the price eﬀect on
brand-names subject to the reform. In a similar way, the two coeﬃcients α3 and α4 measure
t h ec r o s sp r i c ee ﬀect of the reform on brand-names and generics in the therapeutic competitor
group.
Within equation (6), ai control for time constant product speciﬁc factors (both observed
and unobserved) that aﬀect prices, while the period speciﬁce ﬀect, δt, control for time-varying
factors that aﬀect prices equally for all pharmaceuticals. X0
it consists of variables controlling
for price cap regulation and the degree of competition. To control for price cap regulation, we
include the natural log of the average price cap faced by product i at time t, lnPCAP.F r o mt h e
ﬁgures in Section 5, we see that the brand-name prices follow the price cap level quite closely.
Since the price cap is binding for the brand-names, we expect the sign of this variable to be
positive; a lower price cap yields lower average prices, and vice versa. By including the price cap
in our regressions, we ensure that the estimated eﬀect of the reference price system is directly
22compared with the price cap regime.24
To control for the degree of competition, we calculate the Herﬁndahl index, measuring the
degree of concentration within a therapeutic substance group. The Herﬁndal index will be max-
imised (take the value of 10.000) in case of only one product within substance group, capturing
that a drug is still under patent protection and/or there is no (generic) competition. As compe-
tition increases, the index becomes lower. We therefore expect the estimated coeﬃcient to have
a positive sign, i.e., that higher market concentration support higher prices.
6.2 Empirical Results
As noted in the previous section, our estimating strategy relies on that drugs in the comparison
group are "comparable" to drugs in the treatment groups, except for not being treated. Even
though the ﬁgures in section 5 showed quite similar price trends for all three groups of pharma-
ceuticals prior to the reform, this assumption should be tested more thoroughly. We therefore
start out this section by presenting results from two tests of the comparison group: ﬁrst, in the
pre-reform period, after controlling for covariates and product speciﬁce ﬀects, the price trends
for pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing should not be diﬀerent from the price trends
for pharmaceuticals not included in the reform. Second, after controlling for covariates and
product speciﬁce ﬀects, the price trends for pharmaceuticals in the comparison group should
not be diﬀerent in the post-reform period compared with the pre-reform period.
In the ﬁrst test, we run regressions on pre-reform data, where we regress log prices on period
dummies and period dummies interacted with a dummy variable indicating treated products.
We also control for changes in the price cap level, the degree of competition and product speciﬁc
eﬀects. If the interactions are jointly insigniﬁcant, this is an indication of a legitimate control
group, i.e., that unobservable factors aﬀecting price setting are uncorrelated with the probability
that a given product is in the treatment group. In column 1-3 in table 3, we present results where
price trends for pharmaceuticals subject to reference pricing are compared with price trends for
pharmaceuticals in the control group (others group). The ﬁrst model uses the period just prior
to the reform (period 26) as the base group, the second model uses period 13 as the base group,
24As explained in Section 3, the price caps were still calculated for the drugs subject to reference pricing in case
the physicians restricted generic substitution or the patients refused to purchase a cheaper generic drug.
23and in the third model we use the ﬁrst period in our dataset as the base group. The three last
columns in table 3 give similar comparisons of the therapeutic competitors and the comparison
group. Despite a few signiﬁcant interactions in model 3 and 6, we ﬁnd the results from these
regressions quite conclusive due to the fact that joint insigniﬁcants of the interactions are not
rejected in any model.
In the second test, we restrict our sample to pharmaceuticals in the comparison group and
regress log prices on a dummy variable equal to 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise.
In the regression, we control for period dummies, the price cap level, the degree of competition,
and a product speciﬁce ﬀects. Results presented in table 4, show that the dummy variable has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices, and clearly indicates that price trends for drugs in the comparison
group are not aﬀected by the reference pricing reform. On the basis of the results from these
tests, we conclude that the "others" group is a legitimate comparison group.
We start out by estimating a ﬁxed eﬀect model based on a simple version of equation (6),
where we focus on pharmaceuticals exposed to reference pricing only, not distinguish between
brands and generics.25 We see from model 1 in table 5 that the estimated eﬀect of the reform is
a price reduction of about 24 percent. Not surprisingly, this is in line with the results reported in
table 2, where we compared the average prices before and after the introduction of the reference
price system. In model 2, we allow for brand-names and generics to be aﬀected diﬀerently
by the reform. Similar to Aronsson et al. (2001) and Pavcnik (2002), our results show that
reference pricing triggers a stronger price reduction on brand-names (30 percent) than generics
(19 percent). This is also in line with our second prediction from the theory section.
25In the models in table 4, we have tested for three diﬀerent time speciﬁcations; year dummies, period dummies
and a time trend variable. In terms of R-squared, we found that the best speciﬁcation was the one with period
dummies.
24Table 3. Testing for pre-reform differences in price trends between groups of products. Fixed 
effect results with robust standard errors. 
  Reference price group vs. others group  Therapeutic competitors vs. others 
group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Interaction period 1  .043 (.045)  .024 (.025)  -  -.009 (.029)  -.022 (.019)  - 
Interaction period 2    .026 (.044)  .006 (.023)  -.018 (.029)  -.010 (.029)  -.024 (.019)  -.001 (.018) 
Interaction period 3  .031 (.043)  .012 (.021)  -.012 (.027)  -.005 (.028)  -.019 (.018)  .004 (.016) 
Interaction period 4  .057 (.046)  .038 (.027)  .014 (.033)  -.008 (.036)  -.022 (.029)  .001 (.028) 
Interaction period 5  .023 (.041)  .004 (.017)  -.020 (.024)  -.021 (.032)  -.035 (.025)  -.013 (.023) 
Interaction period 6  .016 (.042)  -.003 (.018)  -.027 (.025)  .002 (.034)  -.011 (.027)  .011 (.025) 
Interaction period 7  .008 (.040)  -.011 (.016)  -.035 (.024)  .009 (.030)  -.004 (.020)  .018 (.019) 
Interaction period 8    .007 (.040)  -.013 (.015)  -.036 (.023)  .014 (.029)  .000 (.020)  .022 (.018) 
Interaction period 9  .009 (.039)  -.010 (.014)  -.034 (.023)  .017 (.029)  .003 (.019)  .025 (.018) 
Interaction period 10  .009 (.039)  -.010 (.014)  -.034 (.023)  .020 (.029)  .006 (.019)  .028 (.018) 
Interaction period 11  .056 (.056)  .037 (.040)  .013 (.043)  .002 (.032)  -.011 (.025)  .011 (.024) 
Interaction period 12  .049 (.049)  -.029 (.032)  .006 (.036)  .007 (.031)  -.007 (.023)  .015 (.021) 
Interaction period 13  .019 (.039)  -  -.024 (.025)  .014 (.030)  -  .022 (.019) 
Interaction period 14  .045 (.041)  .026 (.023)  -.002 (.030)  .020 (.029)  .006 (.020)  .029 (.020) 
Interaction period 15  .043 (.040)  .024 (.022)  -.000 (.029)  .015 (.030)  .001 (.021)  .024 (.020) 
Interaction period 16  .065 (.044)  .045 (.027)  .021 (.032)  .028 (.034)  .014 (.027)  036 (.026) 
Interaction period 17  .024 (.039)  .005 (.022)  -.020 (.030)  .038 (.032)  .024 (.024)  .047
* (.023) 
Interaction period 18  .026 (.038)  .007 (.020)  -.017 (.029)  .040 (.030)  .026 (.022)  .049
* (.021) 
Interaction period 19  .015 (.036)  -.005 (.020)  -.028 (.029)  .046 (.032)  .032 (.024)  .055
* (.024) 
Interaction period 20  -.014 (.038)  -.033 (.024)  -.057 (.031)  .030 (.035)  .016 (.028)  .039 (.027) 
Interaction period 21  -.029 (.039)  -.048 (.026)  -.072
* (.033)  .028 (.034)  .014 (.027)  .037 (.026) 
Interaction period 22  -.033 (.039)  -.052 (.030)  -.076
* (.037)  .010 (.035)  -.003 (.028)  .019 (.028) 
Interaction period 23  -.019 (.037)  -.038 (.025)  -.062 (.034)  .013 (.034)  -.001 (.027)  .022 (.026) 
Interaction period 24  -.033 (.037)  -.043 (.025)  -.076
* (.034)  .010 (.034)  -.004 (.027)  .019 (.026) 
Interaction period 25  -.035 (.043)  -.054 (.035)  -.078 (.042)  .012 (.039)  -.002 (.034)  .021 (.033) 
Interaction period 26  - -.019  (.039)  -.043  (.045) - -.014  (.030)  .009  (.029) 
Ln price cap  .707
** (.058)  .707
** (.058)  .707
** (.058)  .604
** (.047)  .605
** (.047)  .604
** (.047) 
Herfindahl-index/100  -.001 (.001)  -.001 (.001)  -.001 (.001)  .000 (.000)  .000 (.000)  .000 (.000) 
Product dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Period  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint insignificance of 
interactions (Prob>F) 
.818 .763 .214 .619 .887 .097 
Number of 
observations 
965 965 965 1397 1397 1397 
Number of products  47  47  47  65 65 65 
R-squared  .53 .53 .53 .50 .50 .50 
*: significant at the 5% level. 
**: significant at the 1% level.
25Table 4. Testing for pre- and post-reform differences in price trends for drugs in the 
comparison group. Fixed effect results with robust standard errors. 
  (1) 
Reform dummy  -.007 (.023)
 
Ln price cap  .778
** (.019) 




Product dummies  Yes 
Period dummies  Yes 
Number of observations  1016 
Number of products  24 
R-squared   .69 
**: significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5. Price effects of reference pricing. Fixed effect results with robust standard errors. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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** 
(.016) 














Product dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  2765 2765 2765 2765 
Number of products  69 69 69 69 
R-squared   .36 .37 .68 .69 
**: significant at the 1% level. 
So far we have not taken price cap regulation into account. From ﬁgure 1-4 we see that
the brand-name prices follow the price cap quite closely. Since the development of the price
cap diﬀers among the three groups, it is important to control for changes in the price cap
level. We ﬁnd an estimated elasticity of around 0.74 (model 3), which clearly demonstrates the
importance of this variable in the price setting behaviour of pharmaceutical companies. This
ﬁnding conﬁrms our ﬁrst prediction from the theory section, namely that we expect a positive
relationship between the price cap and the prices of brand-names and generics.
26By comparing R-squared in model 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that the price cap accounts for about 50
percent of the explained within-group variation in the dependent variable in our sample. More
importantly, after controlling for this variable, we ﬁnd that the estimated price eﬀect of the
reference price system is substantially lower. The price reduction for brand-names is about 18
percent, while generics face a price reduction of about 7 percent. This result is not surprising
since we see from ﬁgure 2-4 that the drugs included in the reference price system face a reduction
in the price cap, while the price cap for those not included is more stable.
Turning to a potential cross price eﬀect, we ﬁnd that prices on products that are therapeutic
substitutes to those included in the reference price system have responded to the reform as well.
A separation of the eﬀect on brand-names and generics (model 4) reveals that it is merely the
prices on therapeutic generics that respond to the reform, by price reduction of 6.4 percent,
whereas the eﬀect on branded therapeutic substitutes is statistically insigniﬁcant by an F-test
and close to zero. A possible explanation is that the price cap is binding for the brand-names
but not for the generics. This implies that we capture any price reductions on the generics,
while for brand-names we observe only price reductions below the price cap. However, under
free pricing, or less strict price regulation, it is likely that also the brand-names will reduce their
prices as a response to the lower prices triggered by reference pricing.
Finally, in model 4, we control for the degree of competition by using the Herﬁndahl index.
The estimated eﬀect of this variable turns out to be statistically insigniﬁcant. However, due to a
possible endogeneity problem, the result must be interpreted with some care. For example, the
probability of generic entry in a market segment might be inﬂuenced by higher prices because of
higher anticipated proﬁt. This suggests a negative correlation between prices and the Herﬁndahl
index, which indicates a downward bias in our estimates. One possible solution to this problem
is to instrument for the variable, i.e., ﬁnding a variable that aﬀects the market concentration but
not directly aﬀects the prices of existing products. However, since the estimated price eﬀects of
the reform are unaﬀected by the inclusion of the competition variable, and since it is hard to
ﬁnd good instruments, we choose not to do so in this study.
To summarize this section, we ﬁnd that the introduction of reference pricing has led to an
average price reduction of about 18 percent on brand names and 8 percent on generics. The
reference pricing system also have a negative price eﬀect on generics in the therapeutic substitute
27group of about 6 percent. We have tested the robustness of these results by running a number
of regressions, where we experiment with diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, diﬀerent comparison
groups and the length of time periods. For exam p l e ,w eh a v ee s t i m a t e dm o d e l1t o4u s i n ga
comparison group consisting of oﬀ-patent drugs facing generic competition only; we have tried
to include diﬀerent competition variables, like the number of generics and whether or not there is
generic competition; we have also estimated the models using two and three month time periods.
In all of these diﬀerent regressions, we got results that did not diﬀer substantially from those
reported in table 5.26
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have analysed the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ pricing
strategies, focusing on the relative performance of reference pricing and price cap regulation. A
unique policy experiment from Norway, where a sub-sample of oﬀ-patent drugs was exposed to
reference pricing, has been exploited to carefully identify the eﬀects on pharmaceutical prices.
Our analysis showed that the reference pricing system induced lower prices of both brand-names
and generics exposed to the system. In addition, we identiﬁed a negative cross-price eﬀect
on therapeutic substitutes still under price cap regulation. Notably, our results are robust to
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and choices of comparison groups, as discussed in the previous
section.
We believe these results are interesting for several reasons. First, the results show that
pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ respond to diﬀerent regulatory regimes. In particular, reference pricing
tends to trigger price competition and lead to lower prices than price cap regulation. This
price response is not obvious considering the complicated structure of demand and supply in
the pharmaceutical industry, including the presence of insurance and informational asymmetries.
Some have also questioned whether reference pricing actually triggers competition (e.g., Danzon,
2001, Puig-Junoy, 2005). However, the pro-competitive eﬀect seems very robust, as several recent
studies, including ours, report lower prices and/or higher generic market shares due to reference
pricing (Aronsson et al., 2001, Pavcnik, 2002, Bergman and Rudholm, 2003, Dalen et al., 2005).
26The results from these regressions are avaiable from the authors upon request.
28Second, the policy experiment enables us to provide evidence, not only on generic compe-
tition, but, importantly, also on therapeutic competition. The negative cross-price eﬀect on
the therapeutic substitutes not exposed to the reference price system shows that there exists
therapeutic competition in the market. The eﬀect is, though, weaker than the direct price ef-
fect, which is consistent with Ellison et al. (1997) who show that generics are closer substitutes
than brand-names with diﬀerent chemical ingredients but similar therapeutic properties, a very
intuitive result.
Third, the results provide some information in terms of policy implications. Reference pricing
turns out to be more eﬀective than price cap regulation in lowering drug prices. Assuming
that total demand (not individual market shares) is relatively inelastic, this strongly indicates
that reference pricing is superior in reducing medical expenditures. To indicate the economic
signiﬁcance of the reform, we can calculate the potential savings in medical expenditures. In
2002 the total sales value of the drugs included in the reference price system amounted to 474.4
mill NOK, with a brand-name market share of about 72 percent. Using our estimated price
reductions of about 18 percent on brand-names and 8 percent of generics, we obtain cost saving
of about 75 mill NOK. This is a conservative ﬁgure of two reasons. First, the reference price
system is likely to trigger a shift in market shares from the brand-names to the generics (e.g.,
Aronsson et al., 2001). Second, when extending the reform to the whole generic market segment,
t h es a v i n g s( i na b s o l u t et e r m s )w i l lb ee v e nh i g h e r .
H o w e v e r ,t h en e g a t i v ec r o s s - p r i c ee ﬀect on therapeutic substitutes outside the system points
at a potential detrimental aspect of reference pricing, namely that it may aﬀect the patent rent
and potentially stiﬂe innovation. Clearly, this is not a great concern if only Norway introduced
such a system, but reference pricing has become increasingly popular worldwide (e.g., Germany,
Netherlands, New Zealand, British Columbia, etc). If an increasing number of large (and rich)
countries implement reference pricing, or other price control mechanisms, it is likely that this
would be harmful to pharmaceutical innovation, as pointed out by, for example, Danzon (2001)
and Scherer (2001, 2004). A recent empirical study by Golec and Vernon (2006) demonstrates
a negative impact of price constraints on pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, stock returns, and
R&D spending.27 The relationship between price regulation and pharmaceutical innovation
27A recent theoretical contribution to the relationship between reference pricing and pharmaceutical innovation
29should also be highly relevant for the ongoing debate in the US after the inclusion of prescription
drugs in the Medicare program.
Despite of its signiﬁcant and intended eﬀect on prices, the index price system was terminated
by the end of December 2004. This decision was mainly based upon the results of a very early
evaluation of the system that used data just until February 2004. Our analysis strongly indicates
that the evaluation was carried out too early. Price reductions became substantial after some
time, especially during 2004. The new regime, which was suggested by the pharmacy association,
is new variant of generic reference pricing, where the reference price is a (step-wise) discount
on the patent period brand-name price that becomes eﬀective when generics have entered and
been in the market for some time. How this new regime aﬀects prices is hard to predict and is
left for future research.
Finally, we would like to emphasis that our study does not perform a social welfare analysis of
the diﬀerent regulatory regimes. A complete welfare analysis would have to measure the eﬀects
of the reference price system on patients’ health condition, the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ proﬁts and
innovation incentives, and, eventually, on the medical expenditures, potentially including the
costs of public funds. Although our paper provides some partial information about proﬁts and
expenditures, through the price eﬀects, a complete welfare analysis is outside the scope of the
current paper and left for future research.
is provided by Bommier et al. (2006).
30AA p p e n d i x
Figure A1. Average prices of brand-names and generics in the reference pricing
group when excluding generics with entry in the sample period.
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